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NOTES AND COMMENTS
dition of the victim should have put the engineer upon notice that the
deceased was not sensitive of his peril.
The holding in the principal case should be contrasted with that in
Smith v. Salisbury and Spencer Railway Co. 1 2 where the deceased was
sitting upon the tracks with his elbows upon his knees and his head
between his hands when struck. There was no evidence of sickness or
intoxication. The court ruled that the case should go to the jury to
determine if the motorman could have avoided the accident by exercis-
ing due care even though the plaintiff was negligent.
In the principal case the deceased was in the same position as in the
Smith case. The victim was not sick or intoxicated in either case and
in both was perceived by the engineer; yet the principal case held that
a nonsuit should have been granted; the Smith case, that it was proper
for the case to go to the jury.
In a majority of the North Carolina cases where the victim is actually
perceived on the tracks, it seems that the court views the facts not from
the standpoint of the engineer in the cabin of his locomotive, but bases
the decision on whether or not the deceased was actually ill or intox-
icated at the time of the accident. Since these facts are not revealed until
after the accident these decisions defeat the purpose of the last clear
chance doctrine except in cases where the deceased was actually ill or
helpless. In spite of their holdings the court emphasizes the apparent
condition of the injured party. If this apparent condition of the victim
is to be the test rather than his actual condition, the court should have
affirmed an application of the list clear chance doctrine in the principal
case. CLARENcE W. GRIFFIN.
Witnesses-Privileged Communications between Physician and
Patient-Waiver Clauses in Insurance Applications.
Plaintiff, as beneficiary, sued defendant insurer on a life insurance
policy issued to her deceased husband. The application for the policy
contained a clause1 waiving the statutory privilege against disclosure
of communications between physician and patient.2 In view of the
- 162 N. C. 30, 36, 77 S. E. 966, 968 (1913). In this opinion the court said,
"If a person be seen upon the track who is apparently capable of taking care of
'himself, the motorman may assume that he will leave the track before the car
overtakes him, but he cannot act upon that presumption with respect to a person
who is apparently insensible of his danger from sleepiness, drunkenness, or any
other like cause." (italics ours).
1, . . And further waive for myself and beneficiaries the privileges and
benefits of any and all laws which are now in force or may hereafter be enacted
in regard to disqualifying any physician or nurse from testifying concerning any
information obtained by him or her in a professional capacity; and I expressly
authorize such physician or nurse to make such disclosures."2 N. C CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1798.
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fact that defendant did not rely upon the clause, the court disregarded
it in determining the admissibility of a physician's testimony.8
While the decision in the instant case is beyond criticism, it never-
theless suggests the general problem as to how, when, and by whom this
privilege may be waived, and, more particularly, the increasingly im-
portant question as to the legal effect of the waiver clauses contained
in many applications for insurance.
That this purely statutory privilege4 may be waived is undisputed.5
But, well-settled as this general principle is, the various ways in which
waiver may be accomplished deserve mention 6 in passing.
Although the privilege is plainly that of the patient during his life,
it passes to his personal representative at his death; and the latter may
waive it.7 The Wisconsin Court, however, holds that the privilege
becomes even more sacred after the death of the patient and that the
deceased's representative is incapable of waiving it. s
Unless a statute requires express waiver, 9 the privilege may be
waived by implication. The bringing of an action by the patient or
his representative, in itself, will not constitute a waiver even when an
essential issue is the existence of a physical ailment,' 0 e.g., in actions
'Creech v. Woodmen of the World, 211 N. C. 658, 191 S. E. 840 (1937).
'This privilege did not exist at common law. Sherman v. Sherman, 1 Root
486 (Conn. 1793) ; Remington v. Rhode Island Co., 37 R. I. 393, 93 Atl. 33 (1915) ;
Banigan v. Banigan, 26 R..I. 454, 59 AtI. 313 (1904) ; Crow v. State, 89 Tex. Cr.
149, 230 S. W. 148 (1921) ; Trial of Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 573
(House of Lords, 1776) ; 5 WIGMOaRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2380.
Twenty-seven jurisdictions in the United States have created this privilege by
statute. 5 WIGMORE, EvmEcE (2d ed. 1923) §2380, note 5.
Since this privilege is strictly statutory, the decisions are controlled by the
wording and construction of the statute of the particular jurisdiction. However,
general propositions in regard to waiver may be derived from analogy to other
privileges for confidential communications which did exist at common law, e.g.,
between attorney and client, husband and wife.
55 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2388.
'The following is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all the cases
dealing with the various types of waiver, but merely an illustrative foundation
for the discussion of -the particular problem of waiver clauses in applications
for insurance.
Schirmer v. Baldwin, 182 Ark. 581, 32 S. W. (2d) 162 (1930) ; Marker v.
McCue, 50 Idaho 462, 297 Pac. 401 (1931); Penna. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler,
100 Ind. 92 (1884); Miser v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 273 N. W. 155
(Iowa 1937); Goram v. Hickey, 145 Kan. 54, 64 P. (2d) 587 (1937) (heirs en-
titled to waive the privilege although executor of the will opposed.waiver) ; Fraser
v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 3 N. W. 882 (1897); Parker v. Parker, 78 Neb. 535,
111 N. W. 119 (1907); National Life and Casualty Co. v. Heard, 148 Okla. 274,
298 Pac. 619 (1931); Indus. Comm. of Ohio v. Warnke, 131 Ohio St. 140, 2
N. E. (2d) 248 (1936).
' Borosich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 239, 210 N. W. 829 (1926);
Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. W. 749 (1920); In re
Hunt's Will, 122 Wis. 460, 100 N. W. 874 (1904).
" For an example of a statute requiring express waiver see N. Y. CIv. PRAC.
(Cahill, 1931 §§352, 354. In the absence of statute, express waiver is not neces-
sary on any principle. Cf. Blackburn v. Crawford's Lessee, 3 Wall. 175, 18 L. ed.
186 (1866).
20 But see 5 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 5, §2389, in which the author severely
criticizes this rule.
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for personal injury,"1 actions to recover on insurance policies,' 2 and
testamentary contests. 13 The privilege may be waived by the patient
by referring specifically in his own testimony to communications made
to his physician.' 4 But where the patient testifies only as to his symp-
toms it is held not a waiver of the privilege, since there is given in
evidence no communication by word or act.15 Waiver may be accom-
plished by the patient or his representative in calling the physician as a
witness and examining him as to the physical condition of the patient; 16
but the offer of the testimony of one physician is not a waiver of the
privilege as to the testimony of other physicians present in consultation
with him.17 However, a waiver of the privilege as to one physician
called by the opponent (by failure to object) is a waiver of the priv-
ilege as to other physicians.' 8 A waiver of the privilege at a former
trial, however accomplished, will bar a claim of the privilege at a sub-
sequent trial.19
By far the most common form of waiver is an express stipulation to
that effect in applications for insurance. In giving legal effect to this
type of clause the courts are confronted with, the oft' presented choice
between allowing a party to contract as he pleases, so long as he acts
voluntarily, and protecting him from his own lack of vision and im-
Where so specifically provided by statute, CoDEs, LAWS, AND CONST. AMEND.
op C.Ani. (Deering, 1935) §1881, par. 4, the bringing of an action will of itself
constitute waiver. See Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 186,
4 P. (2d) 532, 533 (1931), (1932) 20 CALF. L. REv. 302.
U Federal Mining Co. v. Dalo, 252 Fed. 356 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
Foman v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 227 Mo. App. 70, 51 S. W. (2d) 212 (1932).
5 WIGaMORE, op. cit. supra note 10, §2389.
SRauh v. Deutscher Verein, 51 N. Y. Supp. 985 (1898); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. McKim, 54 Ohio App. 66, 6 N. E. (2d) 9 (1935).
25Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Mendez, 250 U. S. 400, 34 Sup. Ct. 553,
63 L. ed. 1058 (1919), aff'g 19 Ariz 151, 166 Pac, 278 (1917) ; Williams v. John-
son, 117 Ind. 273, 13 N. E. 872 (1887) ; May v. Northern Pacific Ry., 37 Mont.
522, 81 Pac. 328 (1905) ; Green v. Town of Nebagamain, 113 Wis. 508, 89 N. W.
520, 1902). Contra: Forrest v. Portland Ry. L. & P. Co., 64 .Ore. 240, 129 Pac.
1048 (1913).
"Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Jacobi, 112 Fed. 924 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901) ; Traveler's
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Hawkins, 182 Ark. 1148, 34 S. W. (2d) 474 (1931);
Wheelock v. Godfrey, 100 Cal. 587, 35 Pac. 317 (1893) ; Pittsburg C. C. & St. L.
Ry. v. O'Connor, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N. E. 969 (1908) ; Hier v. Farmers Mut. Life
Ins Co., 67 P. (2d) 831 (Mont. 1937); McDonnell v. Monteith, 59 N. D. 750,
231 N. W. 854 (1930).
'Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Jacobi, 112 Fed. 924 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901) ; Penna.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92 (1884) ; Barker v. Cunard S. S. Co.,
36 N. Y. Supp. 256 (1895). Contra: State v. Long, 257 Mo. 199, 165 S. W. 748(1914); (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 116; Schlard v. Henderson, 4 N. E. (2d) 205
(Ind. 1936).
' Capron v. Douglass, 193 N. Y. 11, 85 N. F. 827 (1908).
" Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. O'Connor, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N. E. 969(1908); Elliot v. Kansas City, 198 Mo. 593, 96 S. W. 1023 (1906); McKinney
v. Grand St. P. P. & F. Ry., 104 N. Y. 352, 10 N. E. 544 (1887).
".. . After its publication no further injury can be inflicted upon the rights
and interests which the statute was intended to protect .... the consent having
been once given and acted upon, cannot be recalled" McKinney v. Grand St.
P. P. & F. Ry., 104 N. Y. 352, 355, 10 N. E. 544 (1887).
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providence. On the one hand we have the reasoning of Dean Wig-
more. "Since experience has shown that the testimony of physicians
who might assist in the discovery of the truth is likely to be suppressed
by the insured's claim of privilege, and since the contract of insurance
is a voluntary transaction for both parties, the insurer's insistence on
a provision of this sort in his contract is no more than a reasonable
measure of self-protection. '20 On the other hand we have the theory
of the Michigan Court. "... We remain of our opinion that . .. our
statute clearly expresses the legislative intent to prohibit, as a matter of
public policy, anticipatory waivers of this nature which are to become
operative after the mouth of the patient is closed by death.",21
The overwhelming weight of authority holds such clauses to be valid
waivers which preclude an assertion of the privilege in an action on the
policy, 22 while New York and Michigan hold these waivers invalid for
reasons to be discussed presently.'
Under the majority view such a clause is not only binding on the
insured but enforceable against beneficiaries, or any person claiming
any interest under the policy. 23 Under this line of authority the word-
ing of the particular clause is strictly construed in order to limit the
scope of the waiver. Therefore, where the stipulation is construed to
limit the waiver to communications made to physicians who examined
the insured prior to the signing of the application, the clause is not a
waiver as to future communications. 24 But evidence of communica-
' 5 WIGMO E, op. cit. .supra note 13, §2388(b).
:' Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Mich. 247, 248, 163 N. W.
10, 11 (1917).
Wirthlin v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932) ; Lincoln
Nat. Life Ins. Co4 of Ft. Wayne, Ind. v. Hammer, 41 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 8th,1930); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Renault, 11 F. (2d) 281 (D. C. D. N. J.,
(1926) ; Andreveno v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 34 Fed6 870 (E. D. Mo.,
1888) ; Trull v. Modern Woodmen of America, 12 Idaho 318, 85 Pac. 1081 (1906) ;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 37 Ind. App. 48, 76 N. E. 560 (1906) ; Sovereign
Camp W. 0. W. v. Farmer, 116 Miss. 626, 77 So. 655 (1918); Keller v. Home
Life Ins. Co., 95 Mo. App. 627, 69 S. W. 612 (1902); Fuller v. Knights of
Pythias, 129 N. C. 318, 40 S. E. 65 (1901); Templeton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of N. Y., 177 Okla. 94, 57 P. (2d) 841 (1936).
' Trull v. Modem Woodmen of America, 12 Idaho 318, 85 Pac. 1081 (1906)
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 37 Ind. App. 48, 76 N. E. 560 (1906) ; Keller v.
Home Life Ins. Co., 95 Mo. App. 627, 69 S. W. 612 (1902); Modern Woodmen
of America v. Angle, 127 Mo. App. 94, 104 S. W. 297 (1907); Falkinburg v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 273 N. W. 478 (Neb. 1937); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N. E. 176 (1927).
At least one court following the majority rule has held that such a clause
should be construed strongly against the insurer since insurer drew the contract
and since such a stipulation is provided as a means of aiding the insurer to
avoid the policy on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentations as to the health
of the insured Turner v. Redwood Mutual Life Ass'n of Fresno, 13 Cal. App.(2d) 573, 57 P. (2d) 222 (1936).
' Pride v. Interstate Business Men's Ass'n of Des Moines, 207 Iowa 167, 216
N. W. 62 (1927).
Of course, the waiver in such a case is not anticipatory, in the sense of apply-
ing to future communications; but is anticipatory in the sense of applying to a
future claim of the privilege at a later trial. Accordingly, this may or may not
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tions made subsequent to the signing of the application is admissible
where the clause provides for disclosures by any physician who
"... heretofore attended or may hereafter attend . .." the insured.25
In those applications where the clause does not by its own terms de-
fine the extent of waiver, but merely provides for waiver of the statute,
the scope will of course depend upon the construction of the statute
itself.26
The New York statute27 requires an express waiver at the time of
the trial or at the time of the examination of the physician, and there-
fore such a stipulation is held not to be a waiver.2 8 But the statute
does not affect the validity of a stipulation made prior to its enactment.2 9
The Michigan Court holds these stipulations invalid80 and attempts
to justify its position on two grounds. The first is that public policy
forbids such a waiver because it operates after death has sealed the lips
of the insured and he cannot then raise his voice in contradiction. This
argument takes no account of the possibility of a case arising in which
the patient himself sues on an accident policy, the application for which
contains such a clause. Should such a case arise8 it would be impos-
sible for the court logically to apply this argument, and if it intends to
continue its policy of holding these waivers invalid it would necessarily
have to resort to another line of reasoning. The second ground on
which the Michigan Court bases its decision is that the Michigan statute
creating the privilege3 2 provides, by amendment,8 3 only one situation
in which the privilege may be waived, %Pz., by the heirs at law of the
patient in a contest of the patient's will. It is argued by the Michigan
Court that the statute creates an "absolute privilege"8 4 and that this
fall within the ban of the Michigan Court's rule, depending upon which connota-
tion it attaches to the term "anticipatory waiver."
'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brubaker, 78 Kan. 146, 96 Pac. 62 (1908);
Fuller v. Knights of Pythias, 129 N. C. 318, 40 S. E. 65 (1901).
: Sovereign Camp v. Farmer, 116 Miss. 626, 77 So. 655 (1917).2
"The last three sections (creating the privileged communications) apply to
any examination of a person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are
expressly waived upon the trial or examination by the person confessing, the
patient or client!' N. Y. Civ. PRAc. (Cahill, 1931) §354.
'Meyer v. Knights of Pythias, 198 U. S. 508, 25 Sup. Ct. 754, 49 L. ed. 1146
(1905), aff'g 178 N. Y. 63, 70 N. E. 111 (1904) ; Holden v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 165 N. Y. 13, 58 N. E. 771 (1900); Davis v. Supreme Lodge, K. H., 165
N. Y. 159, 58 N. E. 891 (1900).
'Foley v. Royal Arcanum, 151 N. Y. 196, 45 N. E. 456 (1896) ; Dougherty
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1895).
' Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the Wbrld, 188 Mich. 466, 154 N. W. 575(1915); Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Mich. 247, 163 N. W.
10 (1917).
'A search of the Michigan decisions reveals no case involving these facts.
I Co p. LAws MIcH. (1929) §14216.
'Ibid. (Amended 1909.)
"' It is difficult to understand what the Michigan Court means by the term
"absolute privilege." An "absolute privilege" might refer (1) to a rule of out-
right incompetency--which is no privilege at all; or it might refer (2) to a gen-
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amendment creates the sole exception to it.85 This conclusion is not
only inconsistent with the law applied to waiver of other statutory
privileges but is also inconsistent with previous Michigan decisions
which have held that the patient or those who represent him after
his death may waive the privilege expressly,6 or by failure to claim the
privilege before the physician's testimony is admitted in evidence. 87
The strictness of the Michigan rule and the weakness of its founda-
tion leave no doubt that the majority rule represents the better view.
The latter is consistent with the law pertaining to waiver of the other
privileges for confidential communications8s and is supported by the
strong argument that the enforcement of these clauses greatly dimin-
ishes the possibility of recovery on fraudulent insurance claims.
JoiaN TAYLOR SCHILLER.
uind -privilege which! must be claimed, but which is "absolute" in the sense that it
cannot be waived except by failure to claim it.
Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 188 Mich. 466, 475, 154 N. W.
575, 578 (1915).
' Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 3 N. W. 882 (1897); Grand Rapids &
Ind. R. R. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667, 3 N. W. 173 (1897).
Breisenmeister v. Knights of Pythias, 81 Mich. 525, 45 N. W. 977 (1890).
'85 WIGMOP; EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§2327-2329, 2340.
